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Multi-Domain Operations, bad for civil-military relations? 
By George Fust | 08 August 2019 
Is it possible that the U.S. military’s newest warfighting concept is bad for civil-military 
relations? The current lexicon for this new concept is multi-domain operations, or simply MDO. 
For an in-depth discussion of this concept refer to a recent War On The Rocks article, “A 
Sailor’s Take on Multi-Domain Operations” or The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 
2028. The latter document suggests:  
“…our nation's adversaries seek to achieve their strategic aims, short of conflict, by the 
use of layered stand-off in the political, military and economic realms to separate the 
U.S. from our partners. Should conflict come, they will employ multiple layers of stand-
off in all domains--land, sea, air, space and cyberspace--to separate U.S. forces and our 
allies in time, space, and function in order to defeat us.”    
To counter this threat the military seeks to build the force around three core tenets: Calibrated 
force posture, Multi-domain formations, and Convergence. The theme that joins the three tenets 
is the integration, access, and employment of capabilities “across all domains.” The shift for the 
military to operate in all domains is a first for U.S. military doctrine. It also establishes a 
dangerous precedent. If the military has formally adopted MDO, which it appears they have, they 
should understand its full impact beyond military operations. One such category of concern is the 
field of civil-military relations.  
The bedrock of U.S. civil-military relations is the professionalism inculcated into the force. 
Samuel Huntington theorized the U.S. model as one of objective control. In short, objective 
control is achieved with an apolitical, professional force that executes the directives of the 
legitimate state authority. Military officers swear an oath to the Constitution, which enumerates 
the powers of Commander-in-Chief to the President. Therefore, the U.S. military avoids 
partisanship while carrying out the orders of the executive branch with oversight from the 
Legislative branch. This is the U.S. model of civil-military relations. Multi-domain operations 
threaten this delicate balance because it formalizes the military as an actor in the political sphere. 
A better way to understand this concept is to employ a hypothetical scenario. Imagine a situation 
whereby the President accuses a U.S.-based news organization of being part of an adversaries’ 
information operation. In accordance with MDO doctrine, the military can and should be 
leveraged to counter this threat. The Army’s operating concept suggests “rapid and continuous 
integration of capabilities in all domains…to overmatch the enemy.” Information operations 
includes “social media, false narratives, [and] cyber-attacks.” Thus, the commander-in-chief can 
leverage his military to “defeat” the news organization or at least run counter information 
messaging. This is problematic. What prevents the President from abusing this control and 
offensive capability for his own political gain? The President could become a tyrant without a 
free press to serve as watchdog. The military would subsequently be viewed by the citizenry as a 
political arm to the administration. More than that, they may be viewed as a threat to liberty 
itself.  
Any expansion of the military into a perceived political sphere is dangerous. Eventually the 
military will be unable to avoid partisan criticism. Despite any effort by the military to develop 
controls and mechanisms to prevent abuse, the damage will be done. It is also impossible to 
prevent a President from directly crediting the military with preventing foreign meddling 
“because they like him” personally. The military cannot be drawn into a debate that has any 
semblance of partisanship. Military credibility relies on its non-partisan reputation.  
The current environment is an opportunity to redefine the roles of national security. Other 
executive departments and agencies should take the lead on defense within the political domain 
to prevent damage to civil-military relations. MDO is a sizeable transition for the Department of 
Defense into the nontraditional roles of the military. This can only result in higher civil-military 
interactions in the negative. The military must continue to focus on doing a few things well. A 
lack of focus on clear missions and roles is debilitating for a military. Ultimately, the concept of 
multi-domain operations attempts to serve as a single solution to a complex operational 
environment. It does not adequately take in account the damage that will occur to civil-military 
relations.  
Charles Dunlap famously outlined in “The Origins of the Military Coup of 2012” the danger of 
allowing a military force to self-assign roles or have poorly thought out roles assigned by 
civilians. The danger is derived from the possibility of new roles that are internally focused, and 
subsequently political in nature. MDO has the potential to meet this criterion with its explicit 
focus on defending the political domain. Objective control is not possible when the military is 
viewed as a partisan body. MDO may well turn out to be a pyrrhic victory if it is not reimagined 
through a civil-military lens.  
 
 
